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INTRODUCTION 
The threat of terrorism in America has led many states to strengthen 
their deterrent efforts. Several of these states have chosen to enact 
legislation aimed specifically at terroristic acts not covered under tradi-
tional criminal law. Although it is difficult to imagine an act of terrorism 
which would not also be criminal under existing statutes, the fear that in-
choate acts of terrorism might not qualify for criminal liability has caus-
ed considerable anxiety for law enforcement and judicial officials. Con-
sequently, several jurisdictions in the United States have enacted special 
legislation to make criminal, or increase the sanction for, incomplete acts 
of terrorism. Typically, these laws have been referred to as "terroristic 
threat" statutes. This paper examines the ways in which these statutes 
have been construed and the impact they may have on domestic ter-
rorism. 
First, the ways in which levels of terrorism have affected legislative 
efforts to combat the problem will be described, followed by a discussion 
of state-specific terrorism laws and how these laws have defined and con-
strued the concept of terrorism. In the third part of the paper an analysis 
of the use of these statutes will reveal that few of these laws have been us-
ed in response to "real" acts of terrorism. If these statutes are not being 
utilized to combat terrorism, what laws are prosecutors using to deal 
with "genuine" terrorist acts? The fourth section of the paper addresses 
this issue. 
LEVELS OF TERRORISM AND IMPACT ON 
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES 
Although few statistics are available from the 1960s and early 1970s 
on domestic terrorism, acts of international terrorism, against American 
targets, became a major media event in the late 1960s and early 1970s.1 
As Americans increasingly became the preferred target of established 
organizations using terrorism as a strategy,2 more and more groups arose 
in the 1970s which followed their example.3 Confronted by international 
terrorists abroad and the growth of left-wing Marxist revolutionaries at 
home, concern with this issue, reinforced by sensationalist media prac-
tices, kept terrorism in the forefront of American consciousness. Conse-
quently, the nearly universal disdain for terrorism among the general 
public provided an excellent forum for political officials seeking a sub-
ject apt to elicit strong voter support. Many politicians and legislators 
apparently believe terrorism provides a constructive and fruitful plat-
form as judged by the size of the antiterrorism "bandwagon." The 
decade of the 1970s saw a number of states enact statutes to define and 
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criminalize terrorism. Most of these states have international boundaries 
or border international waters. Table One provides a list of states which 
have such legislation. Most of these statutes have been designated as 
"terroristic threats," although some states have enacted similar legisla-
tion simply designated as "terrorism" or "terrorizing." This trend con-
tinued into the early 1980s. 
Although Americans and American property outside the continental 
United States remain the most popular target of international and 
transnational terrorists, domestic terrorism in the United States is 
remarkably lower than the levels experienced by other western nations.4 
Generally, terrorism in the United States has been declining in the 1980s. 
In 1981 and 1982, the Federal Bureau of Investigation recorded forty-
two and fifty-one incidents respectively. Since 1982 the number of 
recorded incidents has declined each year reaching a low of seven in-
cidents in 1985.5 Although using different measurement strategies, in-
dependent organizations monitoring terrorism also recorded this 
decline.6 A slight increase was recorded in 1986, with nine confirmed ter-
rorist incidents and seven suspected, but unconfirmed, terrorist actions 
as of December 19, 1986.' Despite the relatively low levels of terrorism 
affecting United States citizens at home, terrorism remains a salient 
social issue for most Americans. The popularity among the American 
public of President Reagan's bombing of Libya in April 1986 is in-
dicative of the importance Americans attach to the problem and the 
desire to find quick and effective solutions.8 
The trend toward passage of terrorism-specific legislation appears to 
have abated with the decline of domestic terrorism in the United States in 
the first half of the 1980s. However, the recent activities of right-wing 
neo-Nazi organizations in the northwest and southern United States 
should spark renewed interest in state legislation against terrorism.' 
Unlike previous years in which most terrorist activities were committed 
by left-wing communist groups, Puerto Rican nationalist organizations, 
or responses to anti-semitism, over one-half of the confirmed incidents 
occurring in 1986 were committed by members of right-wing, white 
supremacy groups.'0 With the development of a new "breed" of ter-
rorists in areas previously untouched by domestic terrorism, state 
legislatures no doubt will give rejuvenated attention to efforts at 
criminalizing terrorism. 
CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES IN LEGAL DEFINITIONS 
OF TERRORISM 
A major difficulty in passing legislation aimed specifically at ter-
rorism involves defining the concept. Despite the increasing attention 
paid to the topic, there has been little success in reaching a definition ac-
ceptable to either theorists or members of the international political com-
munity." Terrorism has been considered synonymous with the urban 
guerrilla movement, the "freedom fighters," and, as Michael Stohl12 
suggests, should include governmental practices against internal dissent. 
Many students of the subject conclude that any definition of terrorism 
must consider the outcome, violence utilized, motivation, and goals of 
the "terrorist" to define adequately the concept.13 
30 
Conflict Quarterly 
In a major attempt to rectify these conceptual problems, Grant 
Wardlaw'4 maintains that appropriate definitions of terrorism must 
leave room for the study of terrorism committed against organized 
government and terrorism committed by organized government. He fur-
ther argues that terrorism and the use of terror should remain concep-
tually distinct. Criminals may use terror to achieve their goals and still 
not be terrorists because their goals are private rather than political. For 
students of terrorism whose primary interest is the legal application of 
sanctions against those committing acts of terrorism, Wardlaw's 
ultimate definition does not differ significantly from that of other 
scholars. In maintaining that terrorism involves the threat or use of 
violence "with the purpose of coercing [a] group into acceding to the 
political demands of the perpetrators,"15 Wardlaw succumbs to a defini-
tion that inherently includes motivation for the act as an indispensable 
variable to be used in defining the act. 
While Wardlaw's definition of terrorism may not help the student of 
terrorism legislation, some of his other comments prove to be particular-
ly enlightening. He states that for a definition of terrorism "to be univer-
sally accepted it must transcend behavioral description to include in-
dividual motivation, social milieu, and political purpose."i6 He con-
cludes by noting that "the proper study of terrorism should seek to ex-
plain a phenomenon, not justify i t . " " It is in this realm, however, that 
legislators and those academics involved in making recommendations to 
government regarding an appropriate response to terrorism do have to 
make certain judgements about the moral justifications of an act. Laws 
must go beyond study, and decisions must be made regarding the social 
acceptability of an act, subsequently rendering empirical definitions un-
workable. Consequently, motive or political purpose no longer become 
useful variables in legislating statutes in a system of justice where motive 
is not normally an essential element of an offense. The use of a "univer-
sally accepted" definition has not met with much success in United States 
courts. 
These conceptual difficulties are magnified when one attempts to 
pass legislation that makes an act criminal because it was intended to in-
voke political change or influence an audience beyond the immediate vic-
tims. The issue becomes one of requiring proof of motive as an element 
required in criminal liability. Typically, proof that the act occurred (ac-
tus reus) and that the particular act was accompanied by the required in-
tent (mens red) is sufficient for criminal liability. Normally, motive 
relates only to why a person might commit a given act to achieve a 
desired result. For example, A murders B to obtain money from B's 
wallet. A's intent was to kill and it must be established in court to convict 
on the murder charge. A's motive was to steal and is not an essential ele-
ment of the crime except for use as circumstantial evidence in 
establishing intent. Most academic definitions of terrorism, however, in-
clude as an element of the crime the motive of the perpetrator, that is, to 
invoke political or social change. California, for example, specifies that 
"terrorize" in its terrorist threat statute means: 
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to create a climate of fear and intimidation by means of 
threats or violent action causing sustained fear for per-
sonal safety in order to achieve social or political 
goals. ' * 
California's statute was subsequently challenged on the issue discussed 
above. In People v. Mirmirani19 the California Supreme Court held that 
the phrase "to achieve social or political goals" was unconstitutionally 
vague. In particular, the court raised the issue that whereas the 
"legislature did not intend to criminalize threats that were not made to 
achieve these goals," the entire statute must be declared void, since the 
phrase was vital to the statute. 
California's attempt to make terrorism criminal represents the only 
effort to retain a definition of terrorism similar to that used in academe 
and generally believed by the American public to constitute terrorism. 
Although doomed by its "purist" approach, the statute reflects the enor-
mous conceptual difficulty faced in specifically criminalizing acts of ter-
rorism. How have other states handled this problem? In the section 
which follows, an examination of the predominant tactics utilized by 
other states will be examined. 
CONSTRUCTION AND USE OF "TERRORISM" STATUTES 
A Westlaw20 search of cases from 1970 to March, 1985 involving 
"terrorism," "terrorizing," "terroristic threatening," and similar 
phrases revealed that thirty-seven cases appeared before state appellate 
courts during this period. Fourteen of these cases were only peripherally 
related or resulted in an initial arrest on one of the anti-terrorism 
statutes, but charges were later dropped through plea bargaining. The re-
maining twenty-three cases provide an excellent perspective regarding the 
manner in which various states are interpreting and utilizing these 
statutes. A summary of those cases is presented in Table Two. Most of 
the cases come from states which have patterned their statutes after the 
Model Penal Code's description of "terroristic threat" which specifies 
that a person is guilty of terroristic threat if: 
he threatens to commit any crime of violence with pur-
pose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a 
building, place of assembly, or facility or public 
transportation . . . or in reckless disregard of the risk of 
causing such terror or inconvenience.21 
Of the cases appealed before state courts in Arkansas, California, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas, only two cases involved the commission of a crime to achieve a 
stated political goal or an act or threat traditionally understood or defin-
ed as terroristic in nature. One of these, the California case, which has 
already been discussed, was dismissed on grounds that the phrase which 
qualified the act as terroristic was unconstitutionally vague. Most state 
terrorism statutes are void of any mention of the major identifying 
qualities of terrorism—the use of terror against an instrumental target to 
achieve political change from a primary target. Twenty-one of the re-
maining twenty-two cases all had purely personal or private purposes. 
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The brief review of some of these cases which follows will 
demonstrate the utilization and interpretation of these statutes. Arkan-
sas' statute punishes terroristic threats and provides that a person com-
mits an offense if "with the purpose of terrorizing another person he 
threatens to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial property 
damage to another." Interpreting this statute the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. In Warren v. State, 613 
SW2d 97 (Arkansas 1981) the court held that "where defendant pointed 
a rifle at two men grading a road on what defendant believed to be his 
land, then threatened to shoot them when they started to grade again, 
defendant was properly convicted of terroristic threat rather than a 
misdemeanor assault, since there is no language to indicate the terroriz-
ing must occur over a prolonged period of time, that the mere overlap-
ping of the terroristic threat statutory provisions and the assault statutes 
does not render the terroristic threat statute unconstitutional." Further, 
in Richards v. State, 585 SW2d 375 (Arkansas 1979) the Court of Ap-
peals held that "a threat to shoot another is a threat to cause such 
physical injury to another person as to constitute terroristic threat and 
that the statute does not require that the threat be communicated by the 
accused directly to the person threatened in order to constitute a viola-
tion of the statute." 
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Wilson v. State, 260 SE2d 527 
(Georgia 1979) found that the trial court's charge "when the com-
munication of a threat is done to terrorize another, the crime of ter-
roristic threat is complete" stated the correct principle of law. In Moss v. 
State, 228 SE2d 30 (Georgia 1976) the court held that where evidence of a 
subsequent threat to kill the arresting officer was made after the commit-
tal hearing, it was proper to admit the evidence to show the bend of mind 
and the intent of the defendant. Echols v. State, 213 SE2d 907 (Georgia 
1975) concerned a conviction for aggravated assault with intent to 
murder and for terroristic threat. The court held that the conviction did 
not amount to multiple convictions for the same conduct. Terroristic 
threat is not included within the crime of aggravated assault with intent 
to murder, because each crime involves proof of separate and distinct 
essential elements. The crimes are each aimed at prohibiting specific con-
duct. The constitutionality of the terroristic threat statute was challenged 
in the case of Lanthrip v. State, 218 SE2d 771 (Georgia 1975). The court 
held that the statute providing that a person commits a terroristic threat 
when he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose of 
terrorizing another person is sufficiently definite to give notice of the 
conduct it penalizes. Thus, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague 
and does not deny due process. It is not void because of overbreadth, 
since the proscribed threats clearly fall outside of those communications 
and expressions protected by the First Amendment. In Boone v. State, 
21A SE2d 49 (Georgia 1980) the court held that the crime of terroristic 
threat focuses solely on the conduct of the accused and is completed 
when the threat is communicated to the victim with the intent to ter-
rorize. Further, the court held that the convictions would be upheld 
where statutory requirement of corroboration of testimony of the party 
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to whom the threat is communicated could be met by corroboration by 
the co-victim. 
The terrorism of greatest concern to Americans today typically in-
volves threats communicated against innocent victims, in order to invoke 
change from a third party—the use of an instrumental target to affect a 
primary target. The manner in which states interpret indirect threats is of 
obvious significance to students of terrorism. Five of the twenty-three 
appellate cases annotated in this paper involved some sort of indirect 
threat. In State v. Schweppe, 237 NW2d 609 (Minnesota 1975) the defen-
dant, a thirty-one year old male, communicated threats to the friends of 
a sixteen year old boy with intent to frighten him. The defendant's con-
viction was upheld on the grounds that he intended his threats to be even-
tually communicated by the third party to his victim, thereby terrorizing 
him. 
What if the threats never become known to the victim, that is, the 
third party never communicates the threats to the intended victim? Is the 
defendant still guilty of terroristic threatening? This situation has been 
handled differently by several states. Iowa provides the best example 
with its felony statute on "terrorism" (Iowa Code Ann. 54-708.6 [West 
1981]). The statute is composed of two sections. A person is guilty of a 
Class D Felony when he does any of the following with the intent to in-
jure or provoke fear or anger in another: 
1. Shoots, throws, launches, or discharges a dangerous weapon at 
or into any building, vehicle, airplane, railroad engine or 
railroad car, or boat occupied by another person, and thereby 
places the occupants thereof in reasonable apprehension of 
serious injury. 
2. Threatens to commit a forcible felony under circumstances rais-
ing a reasonable expectation that the threat will be carried out. 
In State v. Jackson, 205 NW2d 420 (Iowa 1981) the defendant was found 
guilty under Section Two of this statute. The defendant had written a let-
ter threatening the governor and his family, which was read by a staff 
member who routinely opened the governor's mail. The governor never 
learned of the threat, nor did he experience any reasonable fear of 
serious injury. The defendant, however, was convicted, and his appeal 
overturned on the grounds that Section Two of that statute did not re-
quire the effects of the threat as an essential element of the offense. 
However, in State v. White, 319 NW2d 213 (Iowa 1982) a defendant was 
charged and convicted under Section One of the same statute, even 
though evidence was not presented which demonstrated that the alleged 
victim experienced apprehension of serious injury. That conviction was 
subsequently overturned on the grounds that, in the absence of evidence 
of fear of serious injury, conviction for "idle" threat was inappropriate 
under this section of the statute. Most states' statutes, however, are 
similar to Section Two of Iowa's law, in that the primary victim need not 
experience fear or even know of the threat to provide the essential 
elements of the crime. 
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The essence of the previous discussion is that efforts to criminalize 
terrorism which include the motive of the terrorist in the statute have not 
been held constitutional. Consequently in their zeal to do something 
about the problem, the various states have resorted to enacting statutes 
which open the door for governmental overreaction. The "terrorists" 
prosecuted under these statutes bear little resemblance to the perceptions 
of most Americans regarding what terrorists are like and what the fight 
against terrorism is all about. If the above-mentioned statutes are not be-
ing used to prosecute terrorists, what types of charges are being levied 
against offenders whose acts meet more acceptable definitions of ter-
rorism? This issue is briefly explored in the next section. 
PROSECUTION OF FBI LABELED ACTS OF TERRORISM 
Table Three provides a summary of the prosecution of domestic ter-
rorist incidents in 198522. While the prosecutions listed do not include 
convictions for all the suspected terrorist activities, the list is complete 
for incidents recorded by the FBI as domestic terrorism and prosecuted 
in 1985. Three important points are noticeable. First, in all of the cases 
prosecuted, convictions were obtained under longstanding criminal 
statutes. None of the cases identified utilized terrorism-specific statutes. 
Second, since the FBI claims authority to respond to ongoing acts of ter-
rorism, most prosecutions in recent years for domestic terrorism have 
been pursued in federal courts.23 Statistics for 1986 reveal this continuing 
trend. In 1986 seven of the known domestic terrorist incidents involved 
bombings or attempted bombings, one was an assassination, and the 
final one involved the tear-gassing of the New York Metropolitan Opera 
House. All of these incidents can be prosecuted under existing criminal 
statutes. Finally, the sentences received in 1985 by offenders for acts of 
domestic terrorism are substantially higher, with one exception, than the 
sanctions possible under terrorism-specific statutes. In most instances, 
the deterrent value of terrorism-specific statutes is questionable com-
pared to available alternatives. 
PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Legislative bodies in the United States have been very reluctant to 
enact laws which might be construed as limiting the First Amendment's 
guarantee of free speech. With the exception of "harassment" statutes in 
some states, few jurisdictions had been willing, prior to the advent of 
"terroristic threatening," to criminalize speech which had no effect upon 
an intended victim. Most states included threatening behavior under 
their respective assault statutes. A majority of jurisdictions have extend-
ed the scope of the crime of assault to include the tort concept of civil 
assault.24 Under this concept one could be convicted of assault, if the of-
fender committed some act which causes the victim to experience a 
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. An essential element of 
"assault as intentional scaring" is that the victim must experience ap-
prehension. As LaFave and Scott25 note, "If the victim fails to notice the 
threatened battery, the threatener, not having succeeded in his plan, 
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cannot be held guilty of assault." The minority view is, apparently, to 
leave it to civil law to discourage such bad conduct. 
Terroristic threat statutes have altered this rather delicate relation-
ship between an alleged offender's rights of free speech and a victim's 
right to be free of fear and intimidation. Fear of terrorism in the 
American public has seemingly justified this rather mild intrusion on 
American civil liberties. It does, however, represent a trend that, if left 
unchecked, could lead to serious encroachments that might signal a 
deterioration of American democratic freedoms. Under these statutes the 
forbidden conduct, the threat, no longer requires a particular result of 
that conduct, namely, apprehension of bodily injury by the victim, to 
qualify for criminal liability. Consequently, issues regarding proximate 
cause are avoided, since it would no longer need to be established that the 
threat was the legal cause of the fear experienced by the victim. This 
simplification of the essential elements of the crime serves to increase the 
prosecution's ability to convict. 
The desire to "get the terrorist" at all costs may evoke a greater 
price than one should be willing to pay. These initial overreactions by 
jurisdictions within the United States are indicative of a natural desire to 
eliminate the problem before it gains a strong foothold in America. As 
Wilkinson26 notes, however, "the government must show that its 
measures against terrorism are solely directed at quelling the terrorists 
and their active collaborators." Current terroristic threat statutes clearly 
do not meet Wilkinson's criterion. 
The cases reviewed earlier strongly suggest that the government has, 
under the guise of combating terrorism, found a socially acceptable 
method of criminalizing "threats." The validity of these statutes has 
generally been upheld in appellate courts, although these rulings have 
usually addressed behaviors not normally regarded as terroristic. The 
necessity of eliminating motive as an essential element of the crime, while 
legally correct, left most current legislative efforts with a tendency to ap-
ply overly broad definitions that provide proscriptions for behavior that 
should not be viewed as terroristic. 
The deterrent effect of these statutes also appears highly ques-
tionable. Limited to either misdemeanor or minor felony status, the 
sanctions provided for violation of terroristic threat statutes will have lit-
tle effect on highly committed, ideologically-bound terrorist groups. In-
stead, these legislative efforts appear to be little more than an irritant to 
democratic freedom. Most states have construed these statutes in a man-
ner that provides opportunity for governmental abuse and, when used to 
obtain conviction for essentially non-terroristic activity, may be counter-
productive to efforts to reduce terrorism. The statutes in many cases 
merely provide an additional offense with which the offender may be 
charged. While charging the offender with an additional offense may 
assist the prosecutor in plea bargaining, it remains questionable whether 
such a practice effectively serves the ends of justice. 
If some method cannot be devised to limit prosecutorial efforts for 
"terroristic threat" to threats intending to effect political change, the 
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Table One 
States With Terrorism-Specific Statutes 
oo 
State 
Alaska 
Arkansas 
California 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Felony or 
Misdemeanor 
Felony 
Felony 
Felony 
Felony 
Misdemeanor/ 
Felony8 
Felony 
Felony 
Misdemeanor 
Misdemeanor 
Misdemeanor/ 
Felony" 
When Enacted 
or Effective 
1980 
1975 
1977 
1974 
1972 
(Amended 1979) 
1978 
(Amended 1981) 
1970 
1975 
1978 
1977 
Statutory Citations 
Terroristic Threatening 
Alaska Stat. § 11.56.8 
Terroristic Threatening 
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1 
Terrorist Threats 
Cal. Pen. Code § 11.5 
Terroristic Threats or A 
Ga. Code §§ 26-1307 a 
Terroristic Threatening 
Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 7 
Terrorism 
Iowa Code Ann. § 54-
Terroristic Threat 
Kan. Crim. Code Ann 
Terroristic Threatening 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 508.08 
Terrorizing 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
Terrorizing 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ti 
Table One (continued) 
States With Terrorism-Specific Statutes 
State 
Minnesota 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
Texas 
Utah 
Felony or 
Misdemeanor 
Felony 
Misdemeanor 
Felony 
Misdemeanor 
Misdemeanor/ 
Felonyc 
When Enacted 
or Effective 
1971 
1973 
1981 
1974 
1973 
Statutory Cita 
Terroristic Threat 
Minn. Stat. § 609.713 ( 
Terroristic Threats 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann 
Threat by Terror 
R.I. Gen. Laws 11-53-2 
Terroristic Threat 
Tex. Penal Code Ann. 
Terroristic Threat 
Utah Code Ann. 76-5-1 
a. Primarily if threat involves public official or if dangerous instrument used to communicate threat 
b. If evacuation of public facility occurs 
c. If evacuation of public facility is intended 
Table Two 
Appellate Cases of Terroristic Threatening, 1970-
Citation 
1. Warren v. State 
613 SW2d 97 
Arkansas, 1981 
Appellate Court 
Holding 
Affirmed terroristic 
threat conviction 
Nature and 
Characteristics of 
Terroristic Threat 
(General) 
Non-political 
Direct threat 
No force used 
Terroristic 
Defendant 
were gradin 
at the grad 
evidently th 
Richards v. State 
585 SW2d 375 
Arkansas, 1979 
Affirmed terroristic 
threat conviction 
Non-political Defendant 
Indirect threat inserted a s 
No force used road emplo 
of here or 
was promp 
People v. Mirmirani 
636 P2d 1130 
California, (1982) 
Affirmed. Granted 
defendant's motion to 
set aside information 
charging him with 
making threats in order 
to achieve social or 
political goals. 
(Unconstitutionally 
vague) 
Non-political Officer Me 
Indirect threat defendant 
No forced used he didn't u 
to it—that 
to take the 
officer." 
Table Two (continued) 
Appellate Cases of Terroristic Threatening, 1970-
Nature and 
Characteristics of 
Appellate Court Terroristic Threat 
Citation Holding (General) Terroristic 
4. Boone et al v. State Affirmed terroristic Non-political Statements 
274 SE2d 49 threat conviction Direct threat threats that 
Georgia, 1980 Force used narcotics ag 
5. Moss v. State Affirmed terroristic Non-political Defendant 
228 SE2d 30 threat conviction Direct threat result of a 
Georgia, 1976 No force used to jail. Aft 
threats wer 
police offic 
6. Echols v. State Affirmed terroristic Non-political Victim shar 
213 SE2d 907 threat conviction Direct threat Defendant 
Georgia, 1975 Force used four minut 
ahead and 
to talk. Jus 
out of it." 
7. Lanthrip v. State Affirmed terroristic Non-political Defendant 
218 SE2d 771 threat conviction Direct threat wife and si 
Georgia, 1975 Force used gun. The d 
a fit of tem 
Table Two (continued) 
Appellate Cases of Terroristic Threatening, 1970 
Nature and 
Characteristics of 
Appellate Court Terroristic Threat 
Citation Holding (General) Terroristic 
8. Wilson v. State Affirmed terroristic Non-political By telepho 
260 SE2d 527 threat conviction Direct threat the prosec 
Georgia, 1979 No force used 
9. State v. Realina Reversed terroristic Non-political "You fuck 
616 P2d 229 threat conviction Direct threat I'm going 
£ Hawaii, 1980 Force used fucking Fi 
10. Iowa v. Oldfather Affirmed motion in Non-political Defendant 
306 NW2d 760 arrest of judgment Direct threat his automo 
Iowa, 1981 No force used amount to 
statute. 
11. State v. Jackson Affirmed extortion Political Letter to G 
305 NW2d 420 and terrorism Indirect threat the Govern 
Iowa, 1981 conviction No force used 
12. State v. Young Affirmed terrorism Non-political Defendant 
293 NW2d 5 conviction Mis-directed threat brother-in-
Iowa, 1980 Force used multi-unit 
the buildin 
Table Two (continued) 
Appellate Cases of Terroristic Threatening, 1970-
Citation 
Appellate Court 
Holding 
Nature and 
Characteristics of 
Terroristic Threat 
(General) Terroristic 
which he to 
building an 
same apart 
through the 
on the wro 
little girl wh 
the gun wa 
13. State v. Smith 
309 NW2d 454 
Iowa, 1981 
Affirmed in part the 
terrorism and burglary 
conviction 
Non-political 
Direct threat 
Force used 
Defendant 
Ms. Girton 
early morni 
awaiting su 
was awaken 
hands to th 
to remove h 
believed de 
not see it. D 
to have her 
14. State v. White 
319 NW2d 213 
Iowa, 1982 
Affirmed in part the 
terrorism conviction 
Non-political 
Direct threat 
Force used 
Defendant 
vehicle with 
said vehicle 
Table Two (continued) 
Appellate Cases of Terroristic Threatening, 1970 
Citation 
20. State v. Schweppe 
237 NW2d 609 
Minnesota, 1975 
Appellate Court 
Holding 
Affirmed terroristic 
threat conviction 
Nature and 
Characteristics of 
Terroristic Threat 
(General) 
Non-political 
Indirect threat 
No force used 
Terroristic 
Evidence 
defendant 
thus inten 
would be 
defendant 
danger th 
and thereb 
21. Commonwealth v. 
Ashford 
407 A2d 1328 
Pennsylvania, 1980 
Affirmed terroristic 
threat conviction 
Non-political Defendan 
Direct threat repeated t 
No force used to the pol 
them dow 
would stri 
members 
not be saf 
22. Commonwealth v. 
Ferrer 
423 A2d 423 
Pennsylvania, 1980 
Affirmed terroristic 
threat conviction 
Non-political Defendan 
Direct threat testified a 
No force used testimony 
supported 
doubt tha 
Table Two (continued) 
Appellate Cases of Terroristic Threatening, 1970-
Citation 
Appellate Court 
Holding 
Nature and 
Characteristics of 
Terroristic Threat 
(General) Terroristic 
of the defe 
commit a c 
23. Jarrell v. State 
537 SW2d 255 
Texas, 1976 
un 
Affirmed retaliation 
conviction (Motion 
to revoke probation 
sustained) 
Non-political Defendant 
Direct threat threatened 
No force used injury by t 
1. 
2. 
3. 
* 4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Person or Group 
New Afrikan Freedom 
Fighters (9 persons) 
Jaan Karl Laaman 
(United Freedom Front) 
Susan Rosenberg 
Timothy Blunk 
(May 19 Communist Org.) 
James Ellison 
(Covenant, Sword, and 
arm of the Lord) 
Marilyn Buck 
(May 19 CO. ) 
Linda Sue Evans 
(May 19 CO. ) 
Macheteros 
(17 persons) 
"Aryan Nations" and 
Table Three 
Convictions in 1985 Involving Domestic Terrorist I 
Charge 
Firearms violations 
Attempted murder, 
weapons violations 
Firearms violations, 
transportation of explosives 
Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organization 
(RICO) charges weapons 
violations 
Escape 
Weapons violations 
Bank robbery 
Racketeering Influenced 
Jurisdiction 
Federal 
Massachusetts 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
'The Order" (23 persons) and Corrupt Organization 
(RICO) charges 
Conflict Quarterly 
Endnotes 
1. Walter Miller, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Law: A Discussion of the Issues," in 
Abraham Miller, ed., Terrorism: The Media and the Law (Dobbs Ferry, New York: 
Transactional Books, 1982), pp. 13-50. 
2. Central Intelligence Agency, International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis 
and Prognosis (Washington, U.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). 
3. Bonnie Cordes, Brian Jenkins and Konrad Kellen, A Conceptual Framework for 
Analyzing Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1985). 
4. Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism, Public Report of the Vice-President's Task 
Force on Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1986). 
5. Terrorist Research and Analytic Center, FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents and Ter-
rorist Related Activities in the United States: 1985 (Washington, D.C.: FBI, Depart-
ment of Justice, 1986.) 
6. Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism in the United States During 1985 (Santa Monica, Califor-
nia: Rand Corporation, 1986.) 
7. Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, Terrorist Incidents Calendar Year to Date 
(As of 12/19/86) (Washington, D.C.: FBI, Department of Justice, 1987). 
8. "Difference of Opinion" in "Hitting the Source," Time, April 28, 1986, pp. 16-27. 
9. Richard N. Ostling, "A Sinister Search for 'Identity'," Time, October 20, 1986, p. 74. 
10. Terrorist Incidents (1987). 
11. Nicholas Kittrie, "A New Look at Political Offenses and Terrorism," in Marius H. 
Livingston, et al., eds., International Terrorism in the Contemporary World 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 354-375. 
12. Michael Stohl, The Politics of Terrorism (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979). 
13. Jordan Paust, "Terrorism: A Definitional Focus," in Yonah Alexander and Seymour 
M. Finger, eds., Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: John Jay Press, 
1977), pp. 18-29. 
14. Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory/Tactics and Counter-Measures (New 
York: Cambridge University Press 1982. 
15. Ibid., p. 16. 
16. Ibid., p. 4. 
17. Ibid., p. 5. 
18. California Penal Code 11.5.422/422.5 (1977). 
19. People v. Mirmirani, 636 PZ d (California, 1982). 
20. Westlaw is a computer-assisted legal research system utilizing a national, full-text case 
law library which allows users to locate and research legal precedents. 
21. Model Penal Code 211.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
22. See FBI Analysis (1986). 
23. An interview with Terrorism Supervisor, FBI, Birmingham, Alabama. 
24. Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law (St. Paul, Minnesota: West 
Publishing Company, 1977). 
25. Ibid., p. 611. 
26. Paul Wilkinson, "Proposals for Government and International Responses to Ter-
rorism," Terrorism: An International Journal, vol. 5, nos. 1 and 2 (1981), p. 165. 
27. Ibid., p. 163. 
47 
